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Growing up in the Aboriginal community, the idea of Aboriginal sover-
eignty became a concept that seemed inherent.
I had heard the language of "sovereignty,l'had heard the word expressed
as part of my father's politics, as a central part of the politics of the Aborigi-
nal people who influenced me ideologically-Michael Mansell, Gary Foley,
Kevin Gilbert-and I understood from an early age that the concept of "sov-
ereignty" referred to and flowed from a distinct history, a distinct culture, a
distinct community, distinct identity. I had heard the history of how, as the
first peoples, we never conceded our land and our sovereignty remained.
It was not surprising then that as an Aboriginal lawyeq I became in-
terested in the idea of sovereignty under international law and started
doing my doctoral thesis on the argument for existing Aboriginal sover'
eignty under international law. And so I began looking at the fairly
straightforward analysis of how the British claim to sovereignty over Aus'
tralia was invalid, but I began to realize that this was not the most interest'
ing question.
The more interesting question was not how international law defined
"sovereignty" and how we, as Aboriginal people, fit our claims into that
concept. The starting point was to deconstruct the political aspirations of
Aboriginal people when we use the term "sovereignty." This is the appro-
priate starting point because it moves away from a question that is defined
by the parameters of international law and is instead a question defined by
Aboriginal people themselves, by what we want, by what we aspire to.
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THs sraRrrNc porNT for recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty is to ask the
question, "\Uhen Aboriginal people say they want to exercise their sover-
eignty, what does that mean in practice?" The answer may be similar to
other questions about rhe vision for the relationship between Aboriginal
people and the rest of Australia, such as, "'When you say you want a treaty,
what should it include?" or "\fhen you say you wanr to be self-determining,
what would that look likel" This vision can also be seen in various reporrs,
in community expressions such as the Barunga Statement, and in the
speeches ofour leaders and representatives.l
I would argue that it covers a spectrum of claims. It includes the right not
to be discriminated against, the rights to enjoy language, cukure, and heri-
tage, our rights to land, seas, waters, and natural resources, the right to be
educated and to work, the right to be economically self-sufficienr, he right to
be involved in decision-making processes that impact upon our lives, and the
right to govern and manage our own affairs and our own communities.
These claims can be conceptualized into three categories:
o Equality rights (the righr not to be discriminated against and the
rights to equal access to services, infrastructure, and opportunity).
These are rights that it is assumed all Australians are entitled to but
that Aboriginal people have been historically denied and, despite
laws like rhe RacialDiscrimination Act (tgz), are srill being denied;
o Indigenous rights (rights ro culture, heritage, language, native title).
These are rights that are actually enjoyed by most orher Ausrralians,
but the dominant legal culture has difficulties in conceptualizing a
space for the recognition of Indigenous people wanting to protect
these rights. For example, many Ausrralians for whom English is a
first language have their rights to language effectively looked afteq
but Aboriginal people have no such prorecrion of their language. The
space to accommodate it requires the creation of mechanisms such as
language policies, language centers, and education policy.
o Empowerment rights (rights to make decisions and have control
over the decisions that affect our lives). The law is least tolerant and
policy makers most antagonistic toward the recognition and proteG
tion of these rights. It is in this cluster of rights that the principle of
sovereignty finds the greatest resonance, and it is the area in which
there is the most resistance from the dominant culture.
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FrNornc rnE FRAMEwoRK to achieve the aspiration of Aboriginal sover-
eignty requires the development of ways to ensure the enjoyment of each
of those different types of rights. To better protect equality rights, we need
to strengthen the rights protections that are currently far too weak within
the dominant legal system.
The framers of our Constitution believed that the decision making
about rights protections-which ones we recognize and rhe extent to
which we protect them-were matters for Parliament. They discussed rhe
inclusion of rights within the Constitution itself and rejected this option,
preferring instead to leave our founding document silent on these marrers.
A nondiscrimination clause was discussed but was rejected because it
was believed that entrenched rights provisions were unnecessary, and it was
considered desirable to ensure that the Australian states would have the
power to continue to enact laws that discriminated against people on the
basis of their race, particularly Aboriginal people. It is a telling legacy of these
ideological underpinnings that the first legislation passed by the new Ausrra-
lian Parliament were laws that entrenched the White Australia policy.
The 1997 High Court case of Krzger u The Contmonwealth2 highlights
the further legacy of the choices made by the framers of the Constitution.
This was the first case to be heard in the High Court that considered the
legality of the formal assimilation-based policy of removing Indigenous
children from their families.
The plaintiffs had claimed a series of human rights violations including
the implied rights to due process before the law, equality before the laq free-
dom of movement, and the express right to freedom of religion contained in
s. r16 of the Constitution. They were unsuccessful on each count, a result that
highlighted the general lack of rights protection in our system of govemance
and the ways in which, through policies like child removal, there was a dispro-
portionately high impact on Indigenous people as a result of those silences.
It is a reminder that there are silences in our Constitution about rights
and that these silences were intended, and it gives us a practical example of
the rights violations that can be the legacy of that silence.
This legacy remains despite the attempt to change the place of Ab-
original people in Australia in the l967 rcferendum. Perhaps because of
the focus on "citizenship rights" in the decades leading up rc the referen-
dum, and because the rhetoric of equality for Aboriginal people that was
used in "yes" campaigns, it was inevitable that there would be a mistaken
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perception that the constitutional change allowed Aboriginal people to
become citizens or attain the right to vote. What the alteration to the
Constitution achieved was for Indigenous people to be included in the
census, and it allowed the federal Parliament the power to make laws re-
garding Indigenous people.3
In Kartinyeri u Contmonweahh, a subsequent High Court decision in
r9g8 that considered the powers to make laws regarding Aboriginal people
as a result of the 1967 referendum, it was argued that since the intention of
those advocating for a "yes" vote was that the power should be used to
benefit Aboriginal people, the government could not use the law to take
away rights and benefrts from Aboriginal people.a The majority of the High
Court rejected this argument and held that if the Parliament has the power
to make a law protecting Aboriginal people and their rights, it also has the
power to take those rights away.
The 1967 referendum did not produce a new era of equality for Aborigi-
nal people, as its proponents for constitutional change had hoped. It might
have given the federal government the power to make laws for Aboriginal
people, but there is nothing that requires that this power be exercised in a
way that is beneficial to Aboriginal people. Instead, the most enduring, though
perhaps unintended, consequence of the constitutional change was the new
relationship it created between federal and state and territorial governments.
Rather than being a relationship of cooperation, it has seen governments of
both levels try to blame the other for the failure of Indigenous policy and to
shift the responsibility and the cost away from themselves.
The cumulative effect of this legal framework is that we have a legal
system that still leaves much faith in the benevolence of government. It
allows governments to make all the decisions about Aboriginal rights and
leaves Aboriginal people dependent on the benevolence of government.
A sad history that has been. But you do not need to look back to the past
policies of dispossession, removal of children, and rations instead of wages.
You need only look to the era since the Racial Discrimination Act of ry75
was passed. This legislation that enacts Australia's obligations under interna-
tional law into our domestic legal system has only been suspended three
times, and each time it has been about the rights of Aboriginal people-the
Hindmarsh Island Bridge dispute, the Native Title Amendment Act, and the
Northern Territory Intervention. That the Act that protects citizens from
racial discrimination has been suspended only in circumstances where it
prevents the protecti<
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prevents the protection from applying to the most vulnerable members of the
community is indicative of why governments cannot be trusted to protect
the needs of Indigenous people and why their unfettered responsibility for
policy making for Aboriginal people has been disastrous.
The government agenda in the Northern Territory is a stark reminder
of how vulnerable Aboriginal people remain within the legal framework
established by the Australian Constitution, particularly because our rights
are dependent upon the benevolence of government. While we have been
the sector of the community most susceptible to human rights violations,
the failure to provide a check on government power has also created the
current climate in which dissent can be so easily silenced.
Discussion of improving human rights tends to be dismissed by anti-
rights advocates as the folly and luxury of the elite who are out of touch
with the realities of the day-to-day lives of the masses. This simplistic rhet-
oric fails to appreciate the important role rights play in the small details of
people's lives. Rights such as access to education, adequate health care,
employment, due process before the law, freedom of movement, and equal-
ity before the law target the very freedoms that an individual needs to be
able to live with dignity. They are precious and they are inherent and
should not be given merely at the benevolence of government.
Every other Commonwealth country, even the United Kingdom from
whom we inherited our legal system, has modernized its legal system by in-
corporating a bill of rights that entrenches the contemporary understanding
we have that all people have inherent human rights. Every other Common-
wealth country now draws a line in the sand that tells the government that
this is the point at which you cannot cross, this is the point at which your
power ends. In this era where every Commonwealth country has enacted
antiterrorism legislation that infringes on the human rights of their citizens,
only Australia has no such line to monitor the exercise of power by our
government.
This has created a legal system that places responsibility for human
rights protection with the Parliament but provides no benchmarks or stan-
dards against which the exercise of such power can be measured or tem-
pered. This complete discretion of Parliament over human rights protection
has left Aboriginal people vulnerable to human rights violations and ex-
plains why equality rights remain a key part of the political agenda of Ab-
original people.
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\UueN rr coMES to Indigenous rights, Australian law has little tolerance for
their equal recognition, and this is most clearly illustrated by the way courrs
have conceptualized narive title. While all Australians inherently have the
rights to cultural heritage protection, language, and protection of properuy,
the Australian legal system is constructed in a way that protects those rights
for members of the dominant culture but is less adapred to making laws that
protect those rights in other cultures, including Aboriginal cultures.
One of the clearesr examples of this is the problem rhe dominant legal
system seems to have in accommodating Aboriginal interests in properry.
After ignoring Aboriginal rights to land during the colonizarion process
and subsequently adopting a legal fiction of terranullius, formal common
law did not recognize Aboriginal interesrs to land until the decision in the
Mabo case in r9gz.5 Within rhis recognition of the property rights of Ab-
original people are several characteristics that reveal the continuing in-
ability to protect the property righrs of Aboriginal people in the same wa]'
that the law protecrs the property rights of other Australians.
One of the fundamental vulnerabilities of the narive title regime, as ir
currently exists, is that the interests of the native title holder(s) are treated
as secondary to the property interests of all other Australians. Whenever
there is a conflict between property interests over land where native title
exists, it is always the native title that is found to have been extinguished.
The rhetoric of those antagonistic to native title interests often evokes
the nationalistic myths of white men struggling againsr the land to help
reaffi.rm three principles in the public consciousness:
o that when Aboriginal people lose a property right, it does not have
a human aspecr to it. The thought of farmers losing their land can
evoke an emotive response, but the thought of Aboriginal people
losing their land does not;
o that when Aboriginal people gain recognition of a right, they are
seen as getting something for nothing rather than getting protec-
tion for something they already had. The rights are seen as "special
rights" or sui generis; and
o that when Aboriginal people have a right recognized, it is seen as
threatening the interests of nonAboriginal property owners in a
way that means that the two interests cannot coexist. In this con-
text, native title is often portrayed as beins "unAustralian."
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This is the falsehood that the dominant legal system tells in relation to the
way that native title is held to be extinguished by competing interests. Every
day the law finds innovative ways to balance competing interests in property-
landlords and tenants, mortgagor and mortgagee, body corporates, holders of
easements can all hold an interest in a piece of land, and the law finds ways of
accommodating and balancing them all. All of this ensures that a right that is
conceptualized as existing before the imposition of the dominant legal system,
as being "recognized" and not'treated" by thls dominant legal system, is given
the least protection of any comparable property right (such as an easement).
THr lancrsr cHALLENGE to the recognition of sovereignty is the reluc-
tance to provide a recognition, space, and mechanisms for Aboriginal
people to exercise the ultimate decision-making powers over the matters
that concern us, to exercise empowerment rights.
The dominant legal system here recognizes no jurisdiction. There is
no ability to generate community laws. Customary or cultural laws are
given limited recognition and protection, taken into account in specific
circumstances when the law feels it can comfortably accommodate some
recognition without challenging its ultimate control of the process (such as
the Fernando principles in sentencing).6
And when small windows are given to Aboriginal people to exercise
more control, the results are positive. Consider the circle sentencing trials
in New South \fales. This is the process whereby members of the Aborigi-
nal community decide the punishment for offenders who have admitted
their guilt in relation to the matters they were charged with. This is an
example of an innovative mechanism that has been explored to assist with
the problem of the disproportionate number of Indigenous youth who have
contact with the criminal justice system. It offers a way of dealing with of-
fending behavior that is focused on building a sense of personal responsi-
bility and strengthening strong community ties. It has reduced recidivism
and directed young offenders away from custodial sentences.
The circle sentencing model shows how space can be created within
the dominant legal system for Aboriginal people to exercise decision-mak
ing power and authority. But these programs are piecemeal, underre-
sourced, and usually run as pilot projects. They are also merely an adjunct
to the larger processes of the criminal justice system. They do not envisage
the recognition of a jurisdiction vested in the Aboriginal people.
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This stands in stark contrast to the way other countries recognize that
their Indigenous people retain some inherent control over their own af-
fairs. For example, the United States Supreme Court established a legal
doctrine through three key cases that would define the rights and jurisdic-
tion of Native people in the United States.
o Johnson w MclntoshT--:fhe "discovery" of lands in the New World
gave the discovering European power sovereignty and good title
against all other European powers and gave them "the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives." The "lndians" retained the
right of occupancy that the discovering nation could extinguish "by
purchase or by conquest." The sovereign could grant land occupied
by Native people but it was subject to the right of Native people to
occupy it. The impact of the decision was to recognize a legal right
of Natives to their lands, good against all third parties but existing
at the sufferance of the federal government.
o Cherokee Narion v GeorgiagJhe Cherokee nation was considered
a "state," that is "a distinct political society separated from others,
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself." However,
it was not a "foreign" state. Chief Justice Marshall described these
states as domestic dependent nations.
o Worcester v Georgiae-Chief Justice Marshall held: "The Cherokee
nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
have no force."lo
The impact of these three cases was to give Native people the status of
"domestic dependent nations" and to prevent states from having any power
over their affairs and limited jurisdiction on the lands of the Natives. The
jurisdictional space for decision making about matters related to Native
people under this "domestic dependent nation" status is unexplored within
Australian jurisprudence.
THs assrNcE oF a strong human rights framework within Australian law
has meant there is little to temper or fetter the exercise of power by the
federal government in relation to policy on Indigenous people. The result
is that often policy approaches are unmindful-or even resentful-of
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international human rights standards, and policy in Australia in relation
to Aboriginal people is heavily influenced by ideology.
Research in Australia and North America has detailed that better socio-
economic outcomes are achieved when Indigenous people are involved in
the setting of priorities within their community, the development of policy,
the delivery of services, and the implementation of programs. This in-
volvement can be characterized as self-determination and, when control is
given centrally to Aboriginal people without constraint, can be a form of
sovereignty. In this way, the aspect of sovereignty that is about providing
Aboriginal people the space, resources, and mechanisms to determine
their own future is not just an ideological embrace of "sovereignty," it is a
research-based policy approach.
Despite this evidence, when decisions are made about where to spend
the dollars allocated to Aboriginal affairs, they are often directed not by
looking at what the research shows works to improve socio-economic dis-
advantage, but are shaped by the ideologies embraced by government.
Under the Howard government (ry96-zoo) these ideologies were:
o assimilation and mainstreaming;
o mutual obligation and shared responsibility;
. unlocking control of Indigenous-controlled land so that it could be
accessed by nonJndigenous interests; and
o that the "real Aborigines" live in the north.
If there is an example we can use that can highlight the way in which
the ideological drivers shaped approaches to Indigenous policy, it is the
Northern Territory Intervention. The Intervention represented the Com-
monwealth's "emergency response" to a 2oo7 report into child sexual abuse
in Aboriginal communities of the Northern Territory. The government
chose not to implement the recommendations of the report, rather acting
to quarantine welfare payments, force the acquisition of townships through
compulsory leases linked to service provision, increasing policing and
sending in the army, scrapping the access permit system, and appointing
managers to all prescribed communities.
At the outset we need to remember that Aboriginal communities and
the women and men who live in them had been pleading for decades for
more resources for housing, health services, and police services in their
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communities to assist them with dealing with levels of violence within
their community. In the interim, many successful programs had been de-
veloped by community members, often without government assistance,
such as night patrols, dry-out areas, and safe houses. That is, they had been
exercising a form of self.determination and sovereignty in solving these
pressing issues within their community.
Apart from the much-needed additional resourcing of police and
health services, the key aspects of the Northern Territory Intervention ig-
nored the evidence of what community initiatives were working and in-
stead embraced the ideologies of assimilation and mainstreaming (hence
the failure to fund underresourced Aboriginal health services on the
ground), mutual obligation and shared responsibility (hence the quaran-
tining of welfare payments), unlocking control of Indigenous-controlled
land so that it could be accessed by nonJndigenous interests (hence the
repeal of the permit system and changes to land tenure), and that the "real
Aborigines" live in the north (hence the extraction of resources from In-
digenous progmms in other states to fund the Northern Territory Inter-
vention). It is clear that those aspects of the intervention that were most
driven by ideology had nothing to do with the protection of children.
The intervention in the Northern Territory is a textbook example of
why government policies continue to fail Aboriginal people:
o the policy approach was led by ideology rather than by research or
understanding about what actually works on the ground;
o in fact, the policy approach of the intervention is in direct contra-
diction of what the research shows us works and what experts rec-
ommend as appropriate action;
o the rhetoric of doing what is in the best interests of Aboriginal peo-
ple, or children, masks a list of other policy agendas that are unre-
lated to dealing with systemic problems of violence and abuse and
seek to undermine community control over their own resources; and
r the approach is paternalistic and top-down rather than a collaborative
approach that seeks to include Aboriginal people in the outcomes.
The Rudd and Gillard governments have continued to support the
intervention designed by the Howard government and have continued to
quarantine welfare payments.
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The only clear evaluation of the linking of welfare payments to school
attendance was undertaken with the Halls Creek Tiuancy Tiial. From Febru-
ary to July zoo8 a further scheme, the Halls Creek Engaging Families Tiial,
was introduced on a voluntary basis. The evaluation of the trial, undertaken
by Professor Robyn Penman, found that school attendance of the children
did not improve over the course of the trial. The study noted three factors,
o lack of parental insistence that children get to school in the
morning;
. teacher quality (one teacher showed a 20 percent greater attendance
rate than some of the other teachers), and
. bullying and teasing.
The attitudes of parents are only one of the factors that affected school
attendance. The evidence pointed to the pivotal role that teachers and the
school culture itself play in a community where children decide their own
time-use patterns at an early age. The data also showed that poor or good
attendance did not necessarily run in families. In one family of five chil-
dren, attendance ranged from r4 percent to 88 percent.
There is no evidence that shows that hnklng welfare to behavior re-
forms is effective. ln fact, there is evidence to suggest hat the imposition
of such punitive measures in an already dysfunctional situation will exac-
erbate the stress in a household. 'S7hat the evidence does show works in
getting Aboriginal children into schools are:
. breakfast and lunch programs;
. programs that bring the Aboriginal community, especiaily Elders,
into the schools;
o Aboriginal teachers'aides and Aboriginal teachers;
o curriculum that engages Aboriginal children; and
. programs such as that developed by Aboriginal educationalist Chris
Sarra that marry programs that promote self-esteem and confidence
through engaging with culture via programs that focus on academic
excellence.
This shows that there is much the schools can also do to engage chil-
dren with schooling. It suggests that rather than simply punishing parents
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for their children's nonattendance, the government should be providing
schools and teachers that meet the needs of the Aboriginal community.
It cost $BB million to make the initial administrative changes in Centre-
link to facilitate the welfare quarantining, but nor one dollar was spent in the
intervention on any of the types of programs that have been proven to en-
gage Aboriginal children in schools. All this in communities where only
forty-seven cents is spent for every dollar spent on non-Aboriginal students,
communities where there are not enough teachers and classrooms. A puni-
tive measure placed on families to ensure their children come to school is
hypocritical from any government that neglects the same children by failing
to provide adequate funding for a teacher and a classroom.
Money tagged as "lndigenous-specific funding" often does not make its
way into Aboriginal communities in need. It is estimated that spending on
basic Indigenous health services is, according to Access Economics, esti-
mated to be underfunded by $45o million and that data from the Council
of Australian Governments' trial in Wadeye hlghhghted that for every dol-
lar spent on the education of a nonAboriginal student only forty-seven
cents was spent on the Aboriginal student.ll
The underinvestment in infrastructure was highlighted when a Shared
Responsibility Agreement was signed with the \Tadeye community, and
when the children all turned up to school, there were not enough classrooms
or teachers to accommodate all 0f them.
Aboriginal people have finally seen long-needed resources coming
into their community, but in exchange they have been made to surrender
their rights under the Racial Discrimination Act (tgZ5), the Tiade Prac-
tices Act (rW+), and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
ft976))2 The provision of basic services should never have been inter-
twined with the stripping away of fundamental rights in this way.
The Northern Territory Intervention fails to protect Aboriginal rights in
many ways. There is the failure to protect "equality rights"-through suspen-
sion of the Racial Discrimination Act (rgl), the suspension of the protec
tion of Northern Territory antidiscrimination legislation, and the suspension
of the right to appeal to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. There is a
failure to protect "lndigenous rights"-legislative amendments now prohibit
customary law factors to be taken into account in sentencing, and the in-
tervention has been accompanied by moves to remove bilingual schooling.
And there is a failure to protect "autonomv rights"-the Intervention was
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developed without consultation with the people it would affect and without
the involvement of Aboriginal people working on the ground in communi-
ties across the Northem Territory who had already developed programs and
practices that were working. Their knowledge and expertise was overlooked
and personnel were brought in from outside the territory to undertake work
that community organizations were already doing effectively.
This vulnerability highlighrs the extent to which the rights of Ab-
original and Torres Strait Islanders are dependent upon the benevolence
and paternalism of government. It also shows how a failure of rights protec-
tion means that ineffective or ill-conceived policies are more likely to be
developed and rolled out in Aboriginal communities.
As AusrnalrAN cITrzENS, Aboriginal people are entitled to adequate hous-
ing, adequate funding of teachers and the provision of enough classrooms,
and an adequately funded and appropriate police service. They are entitled to
these things without having to give up hard-won rights to land and to forgo
the protection against racial discrimination and unfair trading practices.
As Australia's first peoples, Aboriginal people are also entitled not just to
citizenship rights, but also their inherent rights as Aboriginal people. This
includes a residual jurisdiction and rights to land and natural resources,
which remain unrecognized by the dominant Australian legal system.
When Aboriginal people speak of "sovereignty," it becomes clear that
it describes a set of political, economic, social, and cultural aspirations that
are achievable, that fit well within our current understanding of basic
human rights, and that also offer a practical approach to policy making
that is supported by the research as being the most effective way of reduc-
ing the socio-economic disparity between Aboriginal people and all other
Australians. It also becomes clear that the anti-Aboriginal, anti-rights ad-
vocates who like to shut down any debate about the recognition of Ab-
original sovereignty as being divisive have clearly never taken the time to
listen to the voices of Aboriginal people.
It is a falsehood that the recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty is a
threat to Australian sovereignty and the two cannot exist. Every day the
law finds ways to balance the sovereignty of local, state, and federal gov-
ernments. Coexisting sovereignty is in no way conceptually difficult for
our laws or institutions-unless it involves the incorporation of the sover-
eignty of Aboriginal people.
176 o Chapter 8
The benefit of finding ways to facilitate the exercise of Aboriginal sover,
eignty is that it not only allows for the empowerment of Aboriginal people,
the research shows that this involvement of Aboriginal people in the critical
decision making that affects their lives produces better policy, more effective
programs and service delivery models, and improved socio-economic our
comes for Aboriginal people, their families, and their communities.
NOTES
1. Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia's
Future (Annandale, N.S.\7.: Federation Press, zoo4), 86-117. The Barunga
Statement was a set of Indigenous political claims and objectives presented to
Prime Minister Robert Hawke in 1988. It called on rhe Australian government
to recognize Indigenous human rights, land rights, and self-determination, to
negotiate a treaty, and to provide specific frameworks for full Indigenous par-
ticipation in national political life.
2. kuger u The Contmonweahh (ry9) ryo CLR r. The plaintiffs, all of whom were
Aboriginal people from the Northern Territory, challenged the validity of the
legal power relied upon ro remove them from their families when they were young
children (one of the plaintiffs was rhe mother of a stolen child). They argued that
this legal power contravened implied constitutional rights to freedom from re-
moval and detention withour due process, to equality under the law, to freedom of
movement and association, and to freedom from laws targeting a specific race for
destruction or genocide, and that it contravened the right to freedom ofreligion in
s. r16 of the Constitution. In rejecting the exisrence of these implied rights, and
the inapplicability of the right to freedom of religion, the High Court found the
Constitution provided no legal protection for members of the Stolen Generarion.
3. The 1967 reGrendum was the result of years of activism led by the Federal
Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders
(FCAATSI). Presented to the Australian electorate as a referendum on equal
rights and citizenship for Aboriginal people, it was passed with more than go
percent of the national vote. It amended Section 5r(xxvi) of the Constitution,
granting the Commonwealth legislative power over Indigenous people and tak
ing that power away from the various srates, and Section rz8 to include Ab-
original people in the census.
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4. Kartinyeri u Commonweakh (the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case) (1998) r95 CLR
T7.ln 1996, the Howard government passed an act authorizing der,elopers rcr
build a controversial bridge between mainland South Australia and Hindmarsh
Island, exempting the area from heritage protection and the Racial Discrimina-
tion Act. A group of Ngarrindjeri women argued that the bridge would inre rt'ere
with "secret women's business," and challenged the act in the High Court ,rn the
basis that s 5r(xxvi) of the Constitution, as amended in ry67, alkrs'eJ the
Commonwealth to make laws only for the benefit of the 'Aboriginal race." The
High Court rejected this argument, deciding that the Commonu'ealrh s'as em-
powered to make laws to the detriment of any particular race.
5. Mabo u Queensland (No. z) (l'992) t85 CLR r. lnMabo, the High C()urr rec\rq-
nized the existence of some Indigenous customary land holdings, knt,s.n as
"native title," where a claimant group could establish a continuing connecrion
with the land and where their title had not been extinguished bv an ,,r'erlap-
ping government land grant.
6. See Larissa Behrendt, Chris Cunneen, and Terri Libesman, indigenou-. Legal
Relations in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, zoo8), rj;-ro7.
The Fernando principles, established by Justice Wood in R u Fernnndo ( r99z).
76 A Crim R 58, set out the ways in which Aboriginality can be considereJ in
sentencing as a relevant factor for explaining the particular offence anJ cir-
cumstances of the offender.
7 . Johnson c)Mclntosh zr U.S. (8 Wheat.) S+l GSzl}
8. CherokeeNationuGeorgia3oU.S. (S Pet.) r (r83r).
9. \X/orcester u Georgia 3r U.S. (6 Pet.) 5r5 (1832).
10. Ibid.
11. Access Economics for the Australian Medical Association, indigenou-s Heclrh
Workforce Needs (Canberra: Australian Medical Association, Julr zoo4) (ntr
longer available online); Bill Gray, Council of Australian Gorrernmerrr-, (CO-{G)
Trial Eonluation: Wadeye, Northern Territory (Canberra: Commonsealth of
Australia, zoo6), available from: http://www.facs.gov.au/sa/indigenous/puhs/
evaluation/coag_trial_site_reports/nt_coag_trial/Pages/default.aspx.
12. The Racial Discrimination Act was suspended to allow the governmenr r() im-
plement the intervention, though this exemption was removed in zoro. It al-
lowed for unfair trading practices, and it watered down Aboriginal land rights
by introducing compulsory leases, by acquiring land without any obligarion r.r
pay compensation or rent, and by scrapping the permit system that had gor-
erned access to communitv land.
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